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Abstract
In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowing firm runs
into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enough to pay all creditors in
full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on their loans. We develop a model of
creditor coordination where a large creditor moves before a continuum of small creditors, and
analyze the signalling effects of the large creditor's investment decision on the subsequent
behavior of the small creditors. The signalling effects crucially depend on the relative size of
the large creditor and the relative precision of information. We derive conditions under which
pure herding behavior is to be expected.
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1 Introduction
If multiple creditors are ¯nancing an investment project a coordination problem can arise
when the borrowing ¯rm runs into ¯nancial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity
is enough to pay all the creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose
on their loans, fearing analogous behavior by other creditors. Such coordination failure
among creditors has been recognized as one of the main causes of recent ¯nancial crises
(see, e.g. Radelet and Sachs 1998, Fischer 1999). Despite its empirical relevance, the issue
has hardly been addressed in ¯nancial market literature, since coordination problems lead
to multiple equilibria if creditors are perfectly informed. By applying the equilibrium
selection framework of global games, Morris and Shin (2004) have developed a basic
model which uniquely determines the incidence of ine±cient liquidation due to creditor
coordination failure. As is well known in the theory of global games, a single large player
can crucially change the equilibrium behavior of the other small players.1 Takeda (2003)
has therefore extended the global-game model of creditor coordination by introducing a
large player who decides simultaneously with a continuum of small players on whether to
foreclose on the loans or not.
In this paper, we modify the global-game approach of Morris and Shin (2004) and Ta-
keda (2003) in order to analyze the signalling e®ects of a large player. As opposed to
simultaneous decisions of creditors, we assume that a continuum of small lenders takes
into account the observable decision of the large creditor who moves ¯rst. This extension
enables us to analyze the large creditor's signalling e®ects. It turns out that the in°uence
of the signalling ability crucially depends on the relative size of the large player and the
relative precision of creditor information. Even a relatively uninformed large creditor, who
has no valuable information to signal, can a®ect the liquidation result, but only inasmuch
as his size is relevant. If size is negligible our results coincide with those derived by Morris
and Shin (2004) and Takeda (2003). If the large creditor is much better informed than
the small creditors, a herding e®ect occurs whereby the small lenders follow the large
creditor's behavior blindly, regardless of their own private information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model and solve for the
equilibrium in the two limiting cases where the large creditor is in¯nitely better or worse
informed than the small creditors. Section 3 compares our results to those derived by
Takeda (2003) to emphasize the signalling e®ects of the large creditor. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A large creditor and a continuum of ex ante identical small creditors are ¯nancing a ¯rm's
investment project. The proportion of loans ¯nanced by the large creditor is ¸ 2 [0;1],
while the investment of every small creditor is negligible. However, the combined mass of
loans ¯nanced by small creditors amounts to (1¡¸). The project's pro¯tability is uncertain
before maturity. If the project succeeds, the ¯rm remains in operation and is able to pay
back the full face value of a loan, normalized to unity, to the creditors. Otherwise the
¯rm is forced into bankruptcy and the creditors receive no liquidation value. Before the
project matures, creditors have the right to review their investment, i.e. to decide whether
1Corsetti et al. (2004) have recently analyzed the role of a large player in the context of currency
attacks.2
to roll over their loans or to foreclose. In the event of premature foreclosure a creditor
receives the collateral · 2 (0;1) per loan. We assume that neither the collateral · nor the
value v of a loan at maturity depends on the timing of the lenders' investment decisions.
Creditors who postpone their decision are able to react on the choices of the ¯rst-move
lenders. Thus, a creditor can either learn from the decisions of the predecessors, or he can
use the own investment decision to signal to the subsequent lenders. As usual in modern
global-game theory, it is assumed that the small creditors ignore the signalling e®ects of
their decisions.
Whether the project succeeds or fails depends on the underlying fundamental state µ 2 R
of the ¯rm. These fundamentals can be interpreted as a measure of the ¯rm's ability to
meet short-term claims from creditors. Let ` 2 [0;1] denote the proportion of loans that
are foreclosed. If the total incidence of foreclosure ` is greater than µ, the ¯rm is forced
into bankruptcy. Otherwise, the project proceeds successfully and the ¯rm is able to pay




1 if ` · µ
0 if ` > µ :
For convenience, we assume that if rolling over a loan yields the same expected payo® as
premature foreclosure, the risk neutral creditors prefer to stop lending.
If creditors know the fundamental state perfectly before reviewing their investment, the
optimal investment strategies depending on µ can be analyzed as follows. For good fun-
damentals µ ¸ 1, the dominant strategy for any creditor is to continue lending since the
project succeeds even if all other lenders prematurely foreclose on their loans. On the
contrary, bad fundamentals µ < 0 imply that premature foreclosure is optimal for every
creditor, irrespective of the decisions of the other lenders. The interesting range is the
intermediate case with 0 · µ < 1. A coordination problem among the lenders occurs since
the optimal investment decision of each creditor depends on the behavior of the others. If
all other creditors stop lending, the expected payo® to rolling over is 0, so that foreclosing
on the loans is the optimal decision. Otherwise, if everyone else continues lending, the
payo® is 1, so that rolling over the loans is the dominant strategy. Thus, under complete
information there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, foreclose and roll over. In addi-
tion, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium if µ 2 [0;1), such that a creditor's optimal
strategy is to foreclose on the loans with probability ` = µ.
The coordination problem among creditors can be resolved by the assumption of incomple-
te information of fundamentals. In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (2004) analyzed
the investment decisions of small creditors possessing uncertain public and private infor-
mation on the fundamentals. In the present paper, we follow Takeda (2003) and drop the
assumption that information on the fundamental state µ is publicly available to creditors
by assuming an improper uniform prior in R. However, the lenders receive private signals
regarding the fundamental state before reviewing their investment. The large creditor
observes the realization of the noisy signal
y = µ + ¿´ ; (1)
where ¿ > 0 is a scale factor indicating the amount of noise and ´ is a random variable with
mean 0, with continuously di®erentiable symmetric density g(¢), and cumulative density3
G(¢). Equivalently, a small creditor i receives the private signal
xi = µ + ¾"i ; (2)
with the scale factor ¾ > 0. The random variable "i is distributed with mean 0, smooth
symmetric density f(¢), and cumulative density F(¢). "i is i.i.d. across creditors and is
independent of the disturbance ´. Each creditor deduces his own estimate of µ, the dis-
tribution of signals reaching the other creditors, as well as their estimates of µ from his
private information.
As argued by Corsetti et al. (2004) within a similar game-theoretic context the small
players prefer delaying their decision, while the large player bene¯ts from signalling and
thus moves ¯rst. Since small creditors do not take into account the signalling e®ects of
their decisions, they have no incentive to make their investment decision ¯rst. Instead,
they might bene¯t from waiting, since they can observe the behavior of the large creditor
and learn more about the fundamental state µ if the large lender moves ¯rst. Thus, it is
a weakly dominant strategy for the small creditors to delay the decision on whether to
foreclose on their loans or not. Since the large creditor anticipates the timing of the small
creditors' investment decisions, he is aware that in equilibrium he can never learn from
their choices. But he knows that he will send a signal to the small creditors if he decides
¯rst. Since the large creditor is concerned with coordinating his decision with those of the
continuum of small lenders, he bene¯ts from moving ¯rst and signalling his decision to
these small creditors. Thus, it is a dominant strategy for the large creditor to stop lending
immediately, if he is ever going to foreclose on his loans.
In this sequential-move game a unique trigger equilibrium exists which is characterized
by the 5-tuple (y¤;x¤;x¤;µ
¤;µ
¤
). The large creditor, moving ¯rst, decides to roll over the
loan if his private signal y is greater than the switching point y¤. If the small lenders
observe the large creditor rolling over his loans, they will also decide to continue lending
as long as their private signal xi exceeds the threshold x¤. But even if the large creditor
decides to foreclose on his loans, high signals xi > x¤ make the small creditors con¯dent
of the project's success and entice them to continue lending. Since x¤ < x¤ and since




corresponding to the respective switching points x¤ and x¤. Failure of
the project can always be averted if fundamentals are sound, µ ¸ µ
¤
, but never if µ < µ
¤.
In the intermediate range µ
¤ · µ < µ
¤
, the project's success depends entirely on the large
creditor's investment decision. Thus, in equilibrium the incidence of ine±cient liquidation
is uniquely determined by the interval [0;µ
¤) and [0;µ
¤
), respectively, depending on whe-
ther the large creditor continues lending or not. Below, we derive conditions that jointly




Having received the signal y, the large creditor's expected payo® to rolling over a loan is
given by





















A low signal y · y¤ leads the large creditor to stop lending. Then the switching point x¤
of a small creditor i is implicitly given by his indi®erence condition
Pr (µ ¸ µ
¤
j y · y
¤; xi = x
¤) = · ; (4)
if a solution to (4) exists. If the probability on the LHS is strictly larger than · for
all xi, x¤ converges to ¡1. Conversely, if the LHS is strictly smaller than the RHS,
irrespective of the private signals xi, the critical signal x¤ tends to 1. Since the large
creditor stops lending, the proportion of loans rolled over until maturity amounts to
(1 ¡ ¸)Pr (xi > x¤jµ), so that in equilibrium the threshold µ
¤
of the fundamentals solves
the critical mass condition
µ
¤




If the large creditor observes y > y¤, he sends an encouraging signal to the small lenders.
Consequently, they prefer rolling over their loans for a larger range of signals. The pri-
vate signal x¤ that makes a small creditor indi®erent between premature foreclosure and




¤) = · ; (6)
if a solution to (6) exists. Otherwise, x¤ ! ¡1, if the LHS is strictly larger than · for
all xi. If · exceeds the probability on the LHS for all xi, x¤ ! 1. The corresponding
threshold value µ
¤ of the fundamentals, below which stopped lending by small creditors
alone is su±cient for the project to fail, solves
µ
¤ = 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)Pr(xi > x
¤jµ = µ
¤) : (7)
To derive the equilibrium thresholds, the equations (3) to (7) have to be solved simul-
taneously. From (1) and (2), the private signal of the large creditor can be rewritten
as
y = xi + ¿´ ¡ ¾"i : (8)
Using the equations (3) and (8), a small creditor's posterior probability assessment of the
project's success conditional on the signal xi and observing the large creditor continuing
lending can be expressed as
Pr (µ ¸ µ
¤ j y > y
¤;xi) = Pr(xi ¡ ¾"i ¸ µ












¯¿´ ¡ ¾"i > µ




Thus, the critical signal x¤ can be derived by solving
Pr (µ ¸ µ




¤;y > y¤;xi = x¤)






¾ ; ¿´ ¡ ¾"i > µ
¤ ¡ x¤ + ¿G¡1(·)
´
Pr(¿´ ¡ ¾"i > µ
¤ ¡ x¤ + ¿G¡1(·))
= · : (9)
Analogously, we can derive the switching point x¤ from condition (4), the case in which
the large creditor has foreclosed on his loans:
Pr (µ ¸ µ
¤





;y · y¤;xi = x¤)






¾ ; ¿´ ¡ ¾"i · µ
¤




¿´ ¡ ¾"i · µ
¤
¡ x¤ + ¿G¡1(·)
´ = · : (10)
Neither of these equations can be solved explicitly in the general case, without making
further parametric assumptions on the distribution of the error terms ´ and "i. Therefore,
we follow the procedure suggested by Corsetti et al. (2004) and con¯ne our analysis to
the limiting properties of the equilibrium to emphasize the signi¯cance of information
precision. In particular, we consider the limiting cases in which the large creditor is much
better and worse informed than the small lenders, respectively.
If the large creditor's private information is in¯nitely more volatile than the small credi-
tors' information (¾=¿ ! 0), the equilibrium behavior of lenders can be summarized by
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: As ¾=¿ ! 0, there is a unique trigger equilibrium with
y
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¿G
¡1(·)
x
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¾F
¡1(·)
x
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸ + ¾F
¡1(·)
µ
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸)
µ
¤
= ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸ :
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition implies that even an in¯nitely worse informed large creditor a®ects the
small creditors' behavior by signalling his investment decision. Since the small creditors'
information is much more precise, the signal of the large lender can not reduce their
uncertainty about the fundamental state µ. However, the observable action of the large
creditor reduces the strategic uncertainty of small lenders, i.e. their uncertainty regarding
the decisions of other creditors. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of the game is
merely a®ected by the size of the large lender. According to @(µ
¤
¡ µ
¤)=@¸ > 0, the
large creditor's in°uence on the project's success or failure is strictly increasing in ¸. As
¸ ! 1, the coordination failure among creditors vanishes as in the case where the project
is ¯nanced by a single creditor. On the contrary, if the large creditor's investment volume
becomes negligible (¸ ! 0), the small creditors' strategic uncertainty does not decrease.





These results change distinctively in the opposite and more evident extreme case of a
relatively better informed large creditor (¾=¿ ! 1). The creditors' switching points and
the corresponding threshold values of the fundamentals can be summarized as follows:6













Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that an in¯nitely better informed large creditor can exert much more
in°uence on the small creditor's investment decisions than in the case with ¾=¿ ! 0.
The large creditor does not only reduce the strategic uncertainty but also eliminates the
small creditors' fundamental uncertainty by signalling his investment decision. Actually,
since the switching points x¤ and x¤ tend to ¡1 and 1, respectively, small creditors
imitate the decision of the better informed large creditor irrespective of their own private
signals. Since the large creditor anticipates that in equilibrium the second movers will
follow him blindly, he acts as if he was the only lender. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of
the sequential-move game with an arbitrarily better informed large creditor corresponds to
the benchmark case with a single lender. Note that this result holds regardless of the size
of the large creditor. Even the informational signalling ability of an entirely insigni¯cant
large lender (¸ ! 0) generates such herding behavior among the small creditors.
3 Signalling e®ects of the large creditor
In order to quantify the sigalling e®ects of the large creditor we compare our results with
those of the corresponding simultaneous-move game which describes the case of unob-
servable investment decisions.2 Since it is not possible to obtain closed-form solutions in
Takeda's model this analysis has to be restricted to the case where the private information
of both creditor types becomes very precise (¾ ! 0;¿ ! 0). The signalling e®ects of the
large creditor are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1:
Fundamental thresholds for the project's success
Large creditor is relatively
Large creditor's informed uninformed
investment decision is (¾=¿ ! 1;¾ ! 0) (¾=¿ ! 0;¿ ! 0)
Unobservable µ¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) µ¤ =
(
·1¡¸
1¡· if ¸ > ·
· if ¸ · ·






= ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸
2The fundamental thresholds of the simultaneous-move game can be derived from Proposition 2 of
Takeda (2003) by taking the limit as ¾=¿ ! 0 and ¾=¿ ! 1, respectively.7




) are always lower (higher) than the corresponding threshold µ¤ in the case of un-
observable investment decisions. In other words, the signalling e®ect of the large creditor
is always positive, regardless of the relative precision of private information. Furthermo-
re, allowing the large creditor to signal to small lenders dominates the outcome of the
simultaneous-move game if private information is arbitrarily precise. This is due to the
fact that a well informed large creditor never makes a wrong decision, i.e. he stops lending
if the true state of the fundamentals is lower than µ
¤. As a consequence, the project fails if
µ < µ
¤ so that the upper threshold µ
¤
becomes irrelevant for the analysis of coordination
failure as ¿ ! 0. Since µ
¤ < µ¤, irrespective of the relative precision of information, a
¯rm facing a very precisely informed large creditor can always reduce the incidence of
ine±cient liquidation by announcing the large lender's investment decision to the small
creditors.
4 Concluding remarks
In their basic model, Morris and Shin (2004) have analyzed the investment decisions of
small creditors obtaining public information about the fundamental state of the ¯rm and
receiving a private signal concerning this state. In our model we have neglected public
information. This has enabled us to concentrate on the updated beliefs of the small credi-
tors conditional on the large creditor's signal without taking into account the information
contained in the prior distribution. Of course, the large creditor has a strong impact on
the small creditor's decisions. This in°uence depends on three factors, the relative size of
the large creditor, his signalling ability, and the relative precision of creditor information.
As was shown by Takeda (2003), the incidence of ine±cient liquidation is low if the size of
the large creditor is considerable, and it is even lower if the large creditor is much better
informed. Additionally, we have derived a strong signalling e®ect of the large creditor. If
his decision is observable, the large creditor has an even stronger in°uence on the incidence
of ine±cient liquidation. The two thresholds of our sequential-move game indicating the
investment behavior of small creditors conditional on the large creditor's signal are higher
and lower, respectively, than the corresponding threshold derived by Takeda (2003) in the
simultaneous-move game. Even a relatively uninformed large creditor, who has no valua-
ble information to signal, can a®ect the liquidation result, but only inasmuch as his size
is relevant. If size is negligible our results coincide with those derived by Takeda (2003)
which in turn coincide with those derived by Morris and Shin (2004) in the version with
an improper prior. If the large creditor is signi¯cantly better informed than the small
creditors, a herding e®ect occurs. Irrespective of his size, the small creditors imitate his
behavior blindly, completely ignoring their own information.
Our results imply that a single relatively well-informed large creditor like a bank can make
the other small creditors either extremely aggressive or not aggressive at all, depending
on the private information the large creditor receives. This reintroduces a stochastic com-
ponent to the foreclosure decisions of multiple creditors. To the extend that the success
of an investment project is the mitigation of a coordination problem among the creditors,
the signalling ability of a precisely informed large creditor is appropriate to reduce the
incidence of ine±cient liquidations.8
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
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Inserting this equation into (7) yields
µ
¤ = 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)Pr(µ
¤ + ¾"i > µ
¤ + ¾F
¡1(·))
= 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ F(F
¡1(·)))
= 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ·)
= ·(1 ¡ ¸) :


















´ = · :





















Inserting into equation (5) yields
µ
¤
= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)Pr(µ
¤




= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ F(F
¡1(·)))
= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ·)
= ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸ :
Using the above results, the creditors' switching points are given by:
y
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¿G
¡1(·)
x
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¾F
¡1(·)
x
¤ = ·(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸ + ¾F
¡1(·) :
Proof of Proposition 2

































´ = 1 > · :
Thus, the switching point of a small creditor who has observed the large creditor rolling
over the loan, tends to
x
¤ ! ¡1 :
Hence, the probability in equation (7) is equal to 1, so that
µ
¤ = 0 :




















´ = · ;10















´ = 0 < ·
in the limiting case where ¾=¿ ! 1.
Thus, the switching point of a small creditor who has observed the large creditor foreclo-
sing on the loan, tends to
x
¤ ! 1 :
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